Suppressing the Beast by Stotzky, Irwin P.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 53 Number 4 Article 16 
7-1-1999 
Suppressing the Beast 
Irwin P. Stotzky 
University of Miami School of Law, istotzky@law.miami.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Irwin P. Stotzky, Suppressing the Beast, 53 U. Miami L. Rev. 883 (1999) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol53/iss4/16 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 




The closing decades of the twentieth century can rightly be charac-
terized as the era of democracy. Indeed, in the past three decades, a
tsunami of democratization spread through most of Latin America and
parts of Eastern Europe. It even touched the historically troubled Carib-
bean nation of Haiti. During the late 1970s, several southern European
nations abandoned longstanding dictatorships and adopted democratic
regimes. During the early 1980s, most Latin American nations repudi-
ated their aged military dictatorships and instituted democracies. In the
1990s, another wave of democratization swept Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, destroying the "Communist Empire."
The process is often described as the transition to democracy. This
terminology, however, conceals a serious ambiguity because it often
refers to two or more distinct situations. The first is a process of adjust-
ments of norms or institutions toward the strictures of the democratic
rule of law. There are, of course, varying stages of conformity. These
stages include different levels of competition between an ideologically
broad spectrum of political parties and differences in the development of
an independent, non-corrupt judiciary that is able to enforce a bill of
rights. The second describes a situation where liberal democratic insti-
tutions exist in full force, but their stability is not yet completely
secured. In this second situation, political, social, economic, and cul-
tural actions and other measures are being taken to achieve a necessary
degree of consensus and social adhesion to those institutions.
Latin American countries are generally in transit to democracy' in
the latter sense. For example, in countries like Argentina, full liberal
and democratic institutions are in place. The idea that social tensions
and conflicts may coercively interfere with those mechanisms, however,
is a distinct possibility. There are also countries, such as Haiti, where
democratic institutions have yet to develop, even though serious
attempts are being made to create, secure, and strengthen them.
Whatever stage of development a nation may be in, however, the
* Copyright, Irwin P. Stotzky, 1999.
** Professor of Law and Director, Center for the Study of Human Rights, University of
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1. For a discussion of the different characterizations of the process of transition, see
TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: LATIN AMERICA (Guillermo O'Donnell, et al., eds.,
1986); JUAN J. LINZ, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES (1978).
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transition to democracy remains a difficult journey. In nations undergo-
ing this transformation, economic, political and social stability has not
yet been fully achieved. The corporatist political and social structures
have not yet been transformed to allow the vast, underprivileged major-
ity access to the basic necessities that ensure a dignified life. Institu-
tional structures of public life, such as a representative legislative
branch, a competent judiciary, and an executive branch that adheres to
its constitutionally imposed boundaries must be developed and stabi-
lized. The rule of law - and thus the fundamental guarantees of due
process - have to become an accepted, basic requirement of public life
and private social interaction. All of this is necessary not only to protect
human rights and the democratic process, but also to reach a satisfactory
level of economic and social development.
These problems and possible solutions cannot be successfully
addressed, however, without a justificatory theory of democracy. Such a
democratic vision requires a continuous order of mutually assured and
encouraged autonomy in which political decisions are manifestly based
on the judgments of members of that order who are free and equal per-
sons. Moreover, the expression of self-governing capacities must oper-
ate both within the formal institutions of politics and in the affairs of
daily life. The democratic order must satisfy the conditions of equal
freedom and autonomy that give it definition.
In this essay, I analyze some of the difficulties nations face in the
transition process, and offer some possible solutions to them. In my
discussion, I concentrate my analysis on corporatism, and I use Haiti as
the primary example. Indeed, I discuss and critique the rather flexible
plan that the Aristide and Preval governments have attempted to imple-
ment in creating the conditions for democracy to grow in Haiti. I then
suggest macro and micro changes, such as a new vision of a political
economy and the breaking down of cultural barriers, that may lead to a
more democratic society.
I. A MAJOR TRANSITIONAL PROBLEM: CORPORATISM
There are a number of significant features of the consolidation of
democracies that have taken place in Latin America and Haiti. These
features include the fact that the process of democratization has taken
place during the worst economic, social, and political crises in the his-
tory of these various nations. In general, these crises include the com-
mission of massive human rights violations (murder, torture, rape),
enormous external debts, hyperinflation, epidemics, the collapse of




Another prominent feature of the consolidation process is the fail-
ure to fulfill the requirements of the rule of law in both the formal and
informal aspects of public and private life. This failure manifests itself
in the concentration of power solely in the executive branch of govern-
ment, leading to massive human rights abuses, and a total disregard for
the functions of the other branches of government, corruption in public
and private economic activities, non-observance of efficient economic
norms, and non-compliance with the most basic rules of social life, such
as elementary traffic regulations. The failure to follow the rule of law
also leads to the stunting of economic and social development. These
features adversely affect the opportunities for democratic changes.
I have elsewhere discussed in depth these features of the transition
process.2 Here, I concentrate on one of the other main obstacles nations
face in the transition process when attempting to create, solidify, and
consolidate democratic institutions - corporatism. Indeed, for the tran-
sition process to succeed, the people must dissolve the network of de
facto power relationships which, in some nations, corporations create
and jealously protect by taking advantage of the power vacuum left by
representatives of popular sovereignty. In other nations, such as Haiti,
where there has never been a democratic system of governance until
very recently, these corporative power relationships have developed for
a variety of historical and cultural reasons. Under the umbrella of
authoritarian rule, a number of social groups representing particular
interests sculpt a place for themselves after a bargaining process which
includes their support for the present regime. Such groups include the
military, religious organizations, coalitions of entrepreneurs, trade
unions, and sometimes even the so-called independent press. Once dem-
ocratic rule is established, of course, these groups stubbornly resist relin-
quishing their power to the representatives of the people.
The concept of corporatism has been the source of much confusion
and specious theoretical differences.3 The problem arises from two dis-
tinct meanings attributed to the word, one more traditional and the other
more technical. In the more traditional sense, corporatism refers to the
control exercised by the state over organizations and interest groups. A
2. See IRWIN P. STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI: THE PROMISE OF DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY (1997)[hereinafter SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI]; Irwin P. Stotzky, Establishing
Deliberative Democracy: Moving from Misery to Poverty With Dignity, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. J. 79 (1998) (the 1998 Ben J. Altheimer Lecture); Irwin P. Stotzky, Creating the Conditions for
Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald
C. Slye eds., forthcoming 1999).
3. For an interesting discussion of the concept of corporatism and its relationship to state and
society in Latin America, see generally AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA
(James M. Malloy ed., 1977).
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prime example is the control that prevailed in Hitler's Germany. The
more technical meaning, and the one commonly used in the political
arena, attempts to describe the supposedly opposite phenomenon: where
these same organizations and interest groups acquire considerable influ-
ence over and exert persistent pressure against government decision
makers. While defining the concept explicitly in this way tends to lead
to more emphasis on one meaning to the exclusion of the other, the term
actually encompasses both meanings when applied to most nations
undergoing the transition process, particularly those in Latin America.
This is not the whole of the matter. Latin American and Haitian
corporatism does not rise to the level of the fascist institutional structure
of legally sanctioned exclusive organizations or interest groups. But
neither does it reduce itself to the pressures that interest groups apply on
political entities in every pluralistic society; for example, when these
groups lobby for or against legislative acts that may affect them. The
Latin American and Haitian reality is considerably more complex. It
includes, among others, both features mentioned above: there is some
control by the State over interest groups and organizations, and there are
a variety of official and unofficial mechanisms that are used to alter their
operation. Simultaneously, however, those organizations exert enor-
mous pressures upon government actors and agencies. This pressure
allows the corporative forces to obtain favored treatment of various
kinds. Some of these privileges even amount to a legal monopoly of the
interests represented in a way that approaches the fascist scheme. In
many circumstances, however, the monopoly power of the corporative
interests is unaccompanied by any significant influence of the State over
these interest groups and organizations. In other situations, alternative
legal or even constitutional privileges short of monopoly may be granted
that shield the organization from the raw competitive forces of popular
expression, such as a "free market." In addition, there are informal ways
that governments may grant favors that in some cases amount to illegal,
indeed corrupt actions.
Corporatism is, unfortunately, very difficult to overcome. It is an
insidious and powerful force. When the transition process is successful,
and the authoritarian regimes are weakened or completely abolished and
are replaced by liberal democracies, the corporative groups whose inter-
ests have been favored struggle to retain as much of their privileges are
possible. These entities ferociously compete with the popular sector of
society, which has recently entered or reentered public life. In many
instances, while the people's entry or reentry overcomes their prior ille-
gitimate exclusion, these very same corporative organizations reclaim
their privileges and deny the people their rightful claims.
[Vol. 53:883
SUPPRESSING THE BEAST
Haiti is a particularly striking example of the devastation created by
corporatism.4 During the most recent military dictatorship, between
1991 and 1994, the armed forces and their paramilitary civilian front -
the attach6s - assumed total power and influence in, and completely
violated and destroyed any semblance of, democratic practices and insti-
tutions. Indeed, the military forces consolidated their rule by intention-
ally and ruthlessly suppressing Haiti's once diverse and vibrant civil
society-a society that brought the promise of direct participatory
democracy to a near reality. Until the 1991 coup, Haiti boasted a huge
assortment of peasant associations, grass-roots development projects,
trade unions, student organizations, church groups, and independent
radio stations. In the rural areas, local groups, generally known as "pop-
ular organizations", formed literacy programs, rural development
projects, and farming cooperatives, often with international support.
The military and para-military forces assassinated approximately 5,000
people, brutalized and tortured thousands of others, and forced almost
500,000 people to go underground. The military systematically
repressed virtually all forms of independent association in an attempt to
deny the Haitian people any organized base for opposition to the brutal
dictatorship. Their apparent goal was to push Haiti back into an atom-
ized and fearful society reminiscent of the Duvalier era. The strategy
seemed to be that even if the international community successfully
returned Aristide to power, he would find it almost impossible to trans-
form his popularity into the kind of organized support necessary to exert
civilian control over the army and to create a democratic institutional
structure that would aid in that endeavor. The cost to the Haitian people
has been astronomical. The very civil society that Haiti needs to con-
front its desperate economic and social problems has nearly been
destroyed.
Recently, the democratically elected government has attempted to
restore the armed forces to their proper constitutional role. One way of
achieving this goal is, for example, to prosecute military officials who
were involved in human rights violations.' But security is an absolute
necessity to pursue this strategy. Thus, these military types must be dis-
armed. With approximately 250,000 automatic weapons cached around
the country and at the disposal of these former military officials, how-
ever, the goal of diffusing military power will be extremely difficult to
achieve.
4. For a thorough discussion of Haitian history and culture that analyzes many of the
problems of the transition process, including corporatism, see SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI,
supra note 2.
5. For a discussion of the moral, legal, and political problems associated with prosecuting
human rights violators in these circumstances, see SILENCING THE GUNS IN HArrI, supra note 2.
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The Catholic Church has played both positive and negative roles in
the lives of these nations. The Catholic Church hierarchy in Haiti, for
example, has for years been siding with the military and the economic
elite. During the military rule, the Church hierarchy exerted great influ-
ence over the regulation of matters of private life and the purity of social
customs. For example, while the vast majority of Haitians are Roman
Catholic Christians, almost all Haitians privately practice Vodoun, the
major Haitian folk religion. Publicly, however, the elites associate
Vodoun with evil. Indeed, successive Haitian authoritarian governments
persecuted many individuals who openly practiced the religion. The
persecution has been encouraged and even generated by the hierarchy of
the Catholic Church.
Moreover, the Vatican is the only nation to have recognized the
political legitimacy of the military coup, and the Church hierarchy has
consistently opposed Aristide. Local churches, however, have long
helped the people of Haiti by nurturing the populist groups in the rural
areas. For example, the Catholic Church has long sponsored literacy
programs for the peasants.
The entrepreneurial sector constitutes another corporative source
directed at the democratically elected government. It seeks to obtain a
variety of privileges or protective measures and preserve those previ-
ously secured. In Haiti, it has attempted to boycott many measures
designed to achieve progressive levels of taxation.6 This elite class has
ruled Haiti since its independence, using the state resources as its per-
sonal bank account and keeping the vast majority of Haitians in a state
of extreme poverty, even slavery.
6. Indeed, when President Aristide first took office in 1990, he met with representatives of
the elite families, almost all of whom can be classified as members of the entrepreneurial sector,
to discuss the payment of taxes. He told them that one of the most serious problems in Haiti was
the failure of those who earned their fortunes in Haiti to pay taxes. In point of fact, throughout the
history of Haiti, the elites simply refused to pay taxes. Aristide then stated that his government
would not attempt to collect taxes owed in the past, but from this date forward, he expected those
people to pay taxes. The representatives of the elite families essentially told Aristide that he
would not be in office long enough to collect taxes. Approximately three weeks after that
meeting, Aristide was overthrown by a military coup. Continuing Interview with President Jean-
Aristide, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, (November 8, 1993 to December 1997). Under the Preval
government, taxes on the elites and the middle class are slowly beginning to be collected. For
example, those who import automobiles are now sometimes required to pay the import tariffs.
Nevertheless, tax collection remains sporadic and inconsistent. Corruption of public officials is a
continuing problem.
7. Ironically, Haiti is the product of a revolution against slavery and colonialism. It emerged
as a nation in 1804, after a thirteen-year struggle against France that resulted in the destruction of
the French colony of Saint Dominique. Almost immediately after independence, the Haitian elites
attempted to recreate the plantation economy, treating the rural masses in much the same way as
the French colonial oppressors had treated them. The former slaves, however, simply refused to
return to a state of slavery. Instead, they settled as small peasants on land bought or reconquered
(Vol. 53:883
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Fortunately, positive changes in the corporativist structures of these
nations have taken place. Presently, the armed forces have lost power
and influence in some countries in Latin America and have generally
been more accepting of democratic practices and institutions. In Haiti,
the armed forces have literally been dissolved. The Haitian army is now
a fifty-person marching band. Nevertheless, former military officials
have continued to create havoc. Since the return of the democratically
elected government in 1994, they have formed criminal gangs, mounted
military attacks against the National Police Headquarters, Parliament,
and the Presidential Palace, assassinated several newly elected Senators
and approximately eighteen newly trained members of the National
Police Force.8
In several nations, the Catholic Church is reluctantly ceding its
claim that the state enforce its vision of private, personal life. In many
of these nations, the trade unions have been enormously affected by
unemployment and by the reduction - sometimes adversely affecting
parties normally allied with the government - of the welfare state.
The great enigma, which is directly related to the controversy sur-
rounding the first feature of the consolidation - the economic and
social crisis - is whether the previous dominant economic groups
remain all-powerful, or have even increased their power, by having
changed their positions as privileged contractors of the state to positions
as owners and thus monopolistic providers of the recently privatized
public services.
In Haiti, the question has a rather unusual twist to it. It is whether
the previous dominant entrepreneurial groups remain powerful or have
been reduced to puppets of the military during the dictatorship, and, if
so, whether they will reassert their power or yield some of it to the peo-
ple. During most of Haiti's history, the military did the bidding of the
elite classes by protecting their economic monopolies and brutally sup-
from the State, or abandoned by large landowners. The urban elites then devised a dual strategy to
counter this problem.
The first part of the plan was economic. The elites used the fiscal and marketing systems of
the country to create wealth-producing mechanisms for themselves. They became traders,
politicians, and state employees. They prospered by living off the peasants' labor. Taxes
collected by the import-export bourgeoisie at the urban markets and customhouses - paid solely
by the peasants - provided the entire source of government revenues. The elites then took over
the state and used the state revenues as their personal bank accounts.
The second part of the plan was political. The strategy was to isolate the peasants on small
mountain plots and keep them away from politics. It was a brilliant but corrupt strategy. The
peasants, who unknowingly subsidized the elites, had no say whatsoever in how the state was to
be run. For analysis of these points, see SIENCING THE GUNS l HAITI, supra note 2; see
generally MICHEL-ROLPH TROUILLOT, HAM, STATE AGAINST NATION: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY
OF DUVALIERISM (1990).
8. See SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI, supra note 2.
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pressing the vast majority of the poor. In turn, the rich paid off the
dictators. During the 1991-1994 coup period, things changed. The mili-
tary took over the country's ports and landing strips, thus enabling its
high-ranking officers to prosper in the illicit drug trade. Even more sig-
nificant, the military increasingly prospered through its control of state
monopolies. It was alarm over these incursions into the economy that
led the economic elite to support, however tentatively, the return of
Aristide to office. The question remains, however, what will the eco-
nomic elite do now that the military dictatorship is over and two succes-
sive democratic governments have come to power?
It is clear from this brief discussion of corporatism that one of the
main obstacles that a nation undergoing the transition to democracy
must overcome is the interpenetration of corporative power relations,
which are remnants of previous populist and authoritarian stages. The
corporations try to preserve their power relations and privileges through
the transition, generating different types of crises, such as a military or
economic threat, which exert tremendous pressure upon the fragile dem-
ocratic system.
II. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
The best means for countering this corporative power is to create a
polity governed by universal and impersonal principles where individual
citizens, who are not identified with any particular interests but preserve
the capacity of adopting different ones, make choices in a process of
public justification and dialogue. In practical terms, this requires broad
popular participation in governmental decision making and its conse-
quent actions led by strong participative and ideologically committed
political parties and parliamentary bodies. These parties and parliaments
must themselves, of course, be internally democratic, open, and
disciplined.
These conclusions are based on a particular vision of democracy
and upon the utmost respect for the autonomy of each individual. In this
view, autonomy consists of the exercise of self-governing capacities,
such as the capacities of understanding, imagining, reasoning, valuing,
and desiring. Free persons have, and are recognized as having such
capacities. In a political order dedicated to serving the conditions of free
deliberation for its members, those members can legitimately expect of
that order that it not only permit, but also encourage the exercise of such
capacities - that it permit and encourage autonomy. Indeed, one of the
hallmarks of liberal democracy is the notion of the citizen, who is not
identified with any interest, but is free to choose and has an equal voice
in expressing his choice.
[Vol. 53:883
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This ideal of the autonomous individual as a paradigm for democ-
racy is based on a theory that rejects the view that democracy is simply a
conglomeration of interested individuals and groups working similarly
to the economy or a mechanism for replacing elites. 19 and many
others"0 have elsewhere attempted to explain democracy as a regimented
mode of the practice of moral discourse by which we try to solve con-
flicts in the light of universal, general, and public principles that would
be accepted in ideal conditions of impartiality, rationality, and knowl-
edge. This, the argument goes, makes democracy morally superior to
other systems of government. Democracy substitutes simple
majoritarian decision for the requirement of a unanimous consensus in
the common and non-regimented practice of moral discourse. But this is
not completely sufficient. This substitution weakens the force of the
prescription that the result of the procedure is morally valid because it
would be accepted under ideal conditions (given the functional equiva-
lence between unanimity and impartiality). Nevertheless, democracy
preserves some epistemological value because the need to justify one's
decision to others and to get as much support as possible for one's posi-
tion generates a tendency toward impartiality which makes it more relia-
ble than other decision processes, such as individual reflection.
This epistemic view of democracy presupposes that individuals,
who are the basic moral persons, are its natural agents and that the free-
dom and equality of their intervention in the democratic process should
be preserved and expanded. This is, of course, not the case when corpo-
rations control the polity and assume the role of intermediaries. More-
over, this conception of democracy as a substitute for moral discourse
presupposes that the primary objects of decision in the democratic pro-
cess are not crude interests, but principles that legitimize a certain bal-
ance of interests from an impartial point of view. While it is possible
that discourse may have its genesis in crude interests, for those interests
to garner majority agreement, advocates must win support and justify
their positions. Thus, the dialogue requires participants to reach for
principals beyond their crude interests - they must reach for principles
from an impartial point of view. In addition, dialogue respects and fos-
ters autonomy. It follows, therefore, that corporations that agglutinate
people around common interests and not around moral views about how
to deal with common interests cannot be the protagonists of the demo-
cratic process.
9. See SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI, supra note 2; Stotzky, Establishing Deliberative
Democracy: Moving from Misery to Poverty With Dignity, supra note 2; Stotzky, Creating the
Conditions for Democracy, supra note 2.
10. See, e.g., CARLOS S. NINO, ETICA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS (1984).
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Corporative entities in transitional societies maintain and even
increase their power whenever democracy departs substantially from the
strictures of the original practice of moral discourse. When this occurs,
public debate becomes restricted and debased, the power of participants
actually to influence people becomes too unequal, and participation of
interested people becomes narrower and weaker. Thus, in order to
strengthen the democratic power of common citizens against that of cor-
porations, it is crucial to broaden and deepen popular participation in
discussion and decision making.
Furthermore, the mechanisms of representation, necessary in large
and complex societies, are prone to be subverted by corporative power.
This subversion can be caused by several factors. There is the possibil-
ity of corruption of the representatives, their indifference or even antipa-
thy toward the people they represent when opposed by corporations, and
the apathy of the people represented. For these reasons, it is essential to
broaden the avenues of direct participation by the people whose interests
are at issue. This is, of course, a difficult task. Nevertheless, it is possi-
ble to do this through general procedures like referenda or popular con-
sultations or through decentralized decisions that allow the concerned
people to participate directly.
Moreover, the vision of democracy as a dialogic process concerned
with moral principles to regulate conflicts allows us to qualify the liberal
rejection of any intermediary between the individual and the State.
Indeed, in a large, complex society, some institutions must protect the
individual against the awesome power of corporatism. The most likely
candidates are political parties, but only when they are the standard or
represent the basis of fundamental principles of political morality. They
are indispensable in a modern and large society, not only because they
nurture those principles in professional politicians, who purport to put
them into practice if duly elected, but also because they exempt individ-
uals from justifying their votes before each other on the basis of princi-
ples. In this view, it is sufficient to vote for a party which organizes its
programs on the basis of public, general, and impartial principles.
The deterioration of the role of political parties in favor of corpora-
tions occurs when the significance of Parliament, the national arena for
these parties, is severally eroded. Unfortunately, the integrity of Parlia-
ment is often diminished by corporative forces in the transition process.
Corporations prefer to exert pressures and achieve agreements in the pri-
vate offices of government rather than in the contentious, pluralistic, and
more public parliamentary corridors. In addition, there is the tendency




Strengthening political parties and the parliamentary institutions in
order to protect the democratic system against corporative power, how-
ever, will work only to the extent that these institutions do not become
transformed into corporations themselves. Unfortunately, this often
occurs, particularly when parties weaken their ideological commitment,
do not promote debates on essential questions of public morality, block
channels of participation, operate through methods of patronage and
clientelism, or resort to personalism and caudillism. If this happens,
these parties and parliaments tend to develop elites with distinctive inter-
ests who are likely to become aligned with members of traditional cor-
porative groups in a manner inimical to democratic principles. This also
causes other dangerous distortions. When parties become corporations,
Parliament becomes weakened by the lack of representatives, by a dis-
course that is both ideologically vacuous and detached from the exper-
iences and interests of the people represented, and by a general
appearance of opacity and self-service.
To alleviate or even avoid this danger, political parties and Parlia-
ment must be substantially strengthened. This can be achieved by open-
ing the parties to broad popular participation, promoting permanent
political debates within them, perfecting internal democratic mecha-
nisms for selecting party leaders and candidates, and giving a public
accounting of the reasons for significant actions, such as how funds are
to be managed. It is also important that the electoral system combine the
need for promoting party cohesion and ideological identity with the need
for the voter to identify with individual representatives, rather than vot-
ing for the party slate. A mixed electoral system incorporating propor-
tional representation with individual candidate selection may satisfy
both needs. This concept can be extended to parliamentary procedures,
which should combine party discipline with a degree of autonomy for
individual representatives.
III. THE ARISTIDE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL: STRATEGY OF SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION
Haiti provides an excellent illustration of the problems that corpo-
rative power poses to nations attempting to move from authoritarianism
to democracy. It is clear that there is a long, hard distance still to be
traveled by the Haitian people in order to fulfill the underlying condi-
tions of the epistemic value of democracy and to overcome corporatism.
Under the dictatorship, the levels of material satisfaction were so low,
the opportunities for informed debate so debased, the institutional struc-
ture so dysfunctional to democratic values, human rights violations so
ubiquitous, and the problems of the consolidation of democracy so
1999]
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intense, that any hope of creating the conditions for a deliberative
democracy appeared to be impossible. Stated otherwise, the distance
between the ideal model and the reality of Haitian life seemed to suggest
that democracy could never become a reality in Haiti. Indeed, looking at
Haiti directly after the coup regime had been forced out and Aristide had
been reinstated to office, one had to ask what could possibly be done to
change this bleak landscape. Fortunately, President Aristide was not
without a plan, and the Haitian people were not without hope.
The 1990 election of Aristide, the first democratically elected presi-
dent in the nearly 200-year history of Haiti, was not only a rejection of
Duvalierism, but a landslide for popular representation. For the first
time in the history of the nation, a majority of Haitians entered into
politics. This was an incredibly important step toward democracy for
the Haitian population. Furthermore, the people who took part in the
democratic explosion at the grass-roots level used the Aristide candidacy
to give formal expression to their lives.
The most important popular expectation to emerge from that elec-
tion is that the repressive role of the state and its corporative forces
would be terminated. But merely removing the weapons of the army
and paramilitary forces is not enough to fulfill that expectation. What is
needed is what I would call a new structure of social relationships,
which will have to go beyond political pluralism. It will require the use
of state power by several successive governments to achieve at least two
major goals. First, the government needs to change the Haitian elite's
perspective and restrict their historic capacity for social repression.
They must begin to realize that the vast majority of Haitians, who have
traditionally been excluded from any decision making role, are human
beings, who should be treated with dignity and respect. They must be
allowed to become productive members of society who, as equal citi-
zens, have an equal voice in the operations of the government. The
elites must realize that their fate is dependent upon improving the lives
of all the Haitian people. Thus, the corporative entities controlled by the
elites must be dismantled. Second, the government needs to make sure
that the anger and resentment of the poor is contained and channeled in a
positive way to improve their living conditions and create hope for their
future.
The Aristide government's plan for social and economic recon-
struction (which I will refer to here as the Aristide Plan), " which the
Preval government has fully embraced, attempts to achieve these goals
in a variety of ways. The objective of the government is "to substan-
11. See Strategy of Social and Economic Reconstruction (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) [hereinafter Aristide Plan].
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tially transform the nature of the Haitian State as the prerequisite for a
sustainable development anchored on social justice and the implementa-
tion of an irreversible democratic order."' 2 The Aristide Plan calls for
shifting the social balance of power away from the executive branch of
government to civil society and local government. To do this, the gov-
ernment means to empower several components of civil society, such as
political parties, labor unions, grass-roots organizations, cooperatives,
and community groups.' 3 The government also intends to create a
vibrant private sector with an open foreign-investment policy.' 4 It con-
ceives of a sound macroeconomic policy that creates the proper environ-
ment for the private sector as one that eschews "foreign exchange
controls, price controls, and other policy induced distortions."' 5 The
Aristide Plan holds that the strategy implemented to realize these goals
must:
" Meet the basic needs and fully mobilize the human potential of the
people of Haiti;
" Demilitarize public life and establish the supremacy of legitimate
civilian control over the military;
" Establish an independent Judiciary;
* Strengthen the institutional capabilities of Parliament, other auton-
omous institutions, and local governments to enable them to play a
constructive and informed role in policy debates and
implementation;
" Limit the scope of state activity, and concentrate it on the mission
of defining the enabling milieu for private initiative and productive
investments;
* Reduce the involvement of the central government in the commer-
cial production of goods and services;
* Redefine the relationship and the distribution of political authority
between the central government and local authorities; and
• Improve the quality of public administration.'
6
To create a democracy, the Aristide and Preval governments have
taken, and further intend to take, a number of concrete steps. Many of
these actions are intended to reduce or even eliminate the power of the
corporative forces. According to the Aristide Plan, the first priority is
the professionalization of the armed forces. Originally, the government
planned to, and did in fact, reduce the then current army from approxi-
mately seventy-five hundred officers and men to around fifteen hundred.
Remarkably, it has gone even further - the army has been totally dis-
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banded, except for the approximately fifty-person marching band. Law
enforcement is to be carried out by a newly created National Police
Force. This plan is still in its early stages of development, however.
Problems originally occurred because some of those selected for the
police force were former members of the armed forces who had commit-
ted human rights abuses. The government has successfully purged the
force of human rights violators, but the police continue to be plagued by
poor training, lack of equipment, and general distrust of the citizenry.17
The second priority is the establishment of an independent judiciary
that is able "to fairly arbitrate conflicts among the members of society,
and provide adequate protection for private sector activity, property
rights and fundamental human rights."' 8 Furthermore, under the Aris-
tide Plan, the Haitian government needs to strengthen the Superior Court
of Accounts "to improve the level and the quality of public debates in
the country, to monitor executive performance and to provide institu-
tional counterweight."' 9 Parliament has a crucial role to play in the
modernization of the economy and society, but, of course, it was
severely weakened during the military dictatorship, and although most
of the economic reforms have to be enacted through laws, the Parliament
was still not equipped to deal effectively with these issues right up until
the end of Aristide's term. Parliament's power, therefore, had to be
strengthened substantially. Presently, Parliament has become more
independent than in the past, but it has also become entangled in a bitter
partisan battle over elections and the plan to privatize all government-
owned enterprises.
In addition to these several key areas of reform, the Aristide Plan
calls for the modernization of the state sector. It requires a reduction in
the civil service to approximately half of the then current 45,000 civil
servants. This is to be achieved through voluntary departure encouraged
by generous severance packages. The plan also requires an improve-
ment in the level of professional competence. 0 The scope and content
of government activity is to be altered by moving away from "tedious
micro-management toward a more strategic approach."'" The smaller
civil service will concentrate on a more limited number of objectives.
"It should refrain from excessive regulation and focus on broad policy
questions."22
In the first year of Aristide's reinstated term, his Administration
17. See SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI, supra note 2.
18. Aristide Plan, supra note 11, at 2.






was quite successful in implementing some of these seemingly impossi-
ble reforms. Aristide dismissed most of the army's high command and
reduced the number of troops. Later in his term, he abolished the army.
He achieved this by appointing new officers, who then dismissed the
troops involved in past human rights abuses. A new civilian police
force, operating under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, is in the
process of being trained and is partly in operation. Work has begun also
on reforming the judicial system. Furthermore, Aristide created the
National Truth and Justice Commission to investigate and write a report
on human rights violations. The Commission finished its investigations
and submitted its report on February 5, 1996, only two days before the
end of Aristide's term as President. The 1500-page report, which was
not made public for some time, includes sixty-three pages of recommen-
dations addressing punitive measures, compensation to victims, and nec-
essary judicial reforms. A separate, confidential report names 900
perpetrators of human rights violations, 300 of whom the commission
recommends should be prosecuted. Moreover, parliamentary elections
took place in July 1995, and presidential elections took place in Decem-
ber 1995. The election led to the second democratically elected presi-
dent in the nation's nearly 200 year history. This represents a key step
in creating stability for the growth of a real democracy.
Perhaps even more significant, Aristide called on the international
community for expertise. He appointed an international team of promi-
nent lawyers to assist the Ministry of Justice in the investigations and
prosecutions of some of the most notorious human rights cases. Preval
has continued these investigations and prosecutions.
Initially, the team concentrated on representative, symbolic cases.
It focused on seeking justice for the murders of Antoine Izm6ry, a suc-
cessful businessman, political activist, and financial supporter of Aris-
tide; Guy Malary, a former Minister of Justice who sought to prosecute
military officials who committed political assassinations; Jean-Claude
Museau, a student who protested against the military abuses and in favor
of Aristide; and Jean-Marie Vincent, a priest who organized peasants to
demand that their human rights be enforced. All of these men were
murdered because of their outspoken opposition to the coup.
The attorneys started their work by compiling all of the public
information regarding these murders and then turned these files over to
the Minister of Justice. The team members interviewed witnesses, col-
lected documents, and pieced together other relevant information. They
helped create investigative teams of international and national police,
and they worked with prosecutors and judges in the development of
cases for prosecution. Several ordonnances (indictments) have been
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issued, many people have been arrested, and, in the Museau case, sev-
eral defendants have been convicted in absentia and sentenced to long
jail terms. In the Izmdry case, not only have several defendants been
convicted in absentia and sentenced to long jail terms, but one defend-
ant, Gerard Gustov ("Zimbabwe"), a ranking member of the paramilitary
group, Front for the Advancement and Progress in Haiti (FRAPH), has
been tried, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor.
This is the first time in the history of the Haitian nation that someone
allied with the dictatorship has been fairly tried and convicted for a
human rights violation; in this case, a political assassination. This con-
viction has had a profound impact on the nation's psyche. People are
now beginning to believe, to some degree, that justice can be achieved
and that the rule of law is an important aspect of a democracy. The
corporative para-military forces have thus been substantially weakened.
Moreover, five special investigative teams have been organized to
investigate political crimes committed by the former authoritarian
regime. These teams have started investigating approximately seventy-
six cases. Each team originally consisted of a member of the U.N. Civil-
ian Police (CIVPOL) and two members of the newly trained and newly
created Haitian National Police. The investigative teams reported to the
Director of CIVPOL and to the Director of the National Police. The
latter was the liaison between the commissaires, judges, and Minister of
Justice. Presently, the teams work directly with the Minister of Justice,
and CIVPOL is no longer involved in the investigations.
In addition, victims' committees have been organized in every
criminal jurisdiction of the country. These groups are soliciting victims
to come forward and detail the atrocities committed against them and to
name the perpetrators of these crimes. Lawyers hired by the government
are filing lawsuits in these cases. These committees not only gather
information, but also create pressure on the actors in the system to do
their jobs - to do justice.
Originally, the international team of legal advisers directed these
operations and conducted parallel investigations into some of the major
cases. Under President Aristide's rule, the team reported directly to him.
Under President Preval's rule, they reported first to the Minister of Jus-
tice. In this way, different kinds of pressures are put on the Haitian
officials who are responsible for enforcing the law.
These impressive advances on the political front, however, have not
been accompanied by progress toward a better material life for the vast
poor majority. For them, grinding poverty and the daily struggle to sur-
vive continue uninterrupted. This is the point at which the Aristide Plan
has serious deficiencies.
SUPPRESSING THE BEAST
The macro-economic aspects of the Plan are clearly intended to
attract large amounts of capital from the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment. So, for example, the Aristide Plan calls for removing quantita-
tive restrictions to imports, and removing the tariffs, except for those on
rice, corn, beans, and sorghum. As the Aristide Plan makes clear, "for a
very limited number of sensitive products a transitory adjustment period
not exceeding seven (7) years might be provided. For these products,
the tariff level will be cut in half immediately."23 The Aristide Plan
claims that this tariff policy will have significant benefits. The authors
of the Aristide Plan claim that it will eliminate contraband and its asso-
ciated corruption, reduce the cost of living, enhance the competitiveness
of exports, establish a competitive playing field for all economic agents,
and curb the powers of domestic monopolists.24
The Aristide Plan, however, recognizes that the tariff plan will
require adjustment assistance to the productive sectors, such as agricul-
ture (basic grains and rice-producing areas). It also recognizes that the
trade regime distortions are not sufficient to allow for resumption of
export performance. Thus, Haiti is "requesting" that its North American
trade partners provide "maximum favorable treatment with respect to
quantitative restrictions and tariffs (including those on the value added
by the assembly sector) for the next ten years."25 In conjunction with its
request, the Aristide Plan recognizes the need to improve domestic tax
collection "for both social equity and medium term economic
stability."
26
Finally, the economic aspect of the Aristide Plan calls for the
divestiture of publicly owned companies. This is seen as necessary
because of mismanagement and because of the associated opportunities
for corruption. The Aristide Plan also suggests that the divestiture must
include implementation of an appropriate regulatory framework and
anti-trust legislation. To limit the possibility of having the divestiture
increase the concentration of wealth within Haiti, the government "will
seek out foreign investors, domestic savers from the professional catego-
ries and the members of the Haitian Diaspora. "27 Part of the ownership
will be transferred to traditionally excluded members of society, particu-
larly to the families of those murdered, tortured, or otherwise harmed by
the military coup.
28
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id.
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The required reforms of the retirement and social security system
"will expand the opportunity to widen the ranks of financial asset own-
ers."29 Half of the proceeds from the divestiture will be put into infra-
structure investments "in the poorest areas and low cost urban and rural
housing. 3 ° In addition, the other half of the proceeds "will be invested
in a permanent trust fund whose annual proceeds will be used to subsi-
dize education and health for the rural poor."
3
1
Criticisms of the economic aspects of the Aristide Plan are power-
ful. To begin with, the democratic process of a new social contract
implies that the State will create a level playing field - a fair chance of
access to power - not only in politics, but also in economic and social
life. In Haiti, such a fair chance of access to power, given Haiti's past
and current situation, cannot simply mean a non-interventionist eco-
nomic policy, an extreme version of laissez-faire economics.
But the Aristide Plan seems to go even beyond the free market
expectations of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
For example, as stated above, it asks for the removal of all import tariffs,
except on a few cereals. The economic program is thus clearly tilted in
favor of the traditional elites - the entrepreneurial corporate sector -
who will dominate the trade in imported products. It is surely not
believable that they would suddenly learn to behave as fair competitors
once the State removes itself from regulating economic life. Even more
disturbing, the Aristide Plan seems to neglect the capacities and interests
of thousands of small urban entrepreneurs and artisans, as well as mil-
lions of peasants. More specifically, for example, removing tariffs on
handcrafted products may quickly put out of business a large number of
the artisans who have supported Aristide. In addition, the unrestricted
importation of food may further diminish peasant revenues and
encourage both rural and urban unrest.
The divestiture or privatization plans may cause long-term
problems.3" In theory, removing the State from vital enterprises will
significantly reduce corporativist influences and help reduce inflation.
On the other hand, the political pressures that consumers may have been
able to exert on the government to keep down the prices of State-pro-
vided services will not exist under the divestiture aspect of the Aristide
Plan. At the same time, the monopoly status of the new private compa-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id.
32. Disagreement over privatization plans led to the resignation of Prime Minister Smark
Michel, a strong advocate for total privatization. As Aristide's term in office ended, he refused to
totally privatize the State-owned enterprises. Under President Preval, a lively debate on this
question is currently taking place in Haiti.
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SUPPRESSING THE BEAST
nies will prevent the activization of free market forces to keep prices
competitive. Absent the unlikely dissolution of these monopolies, the
privatization aspect of the Aristide Plan may prove to be a disaster for
Haiti's economy.
This is not, of course, the whole of the problem. The international
community is not helping to alleviate these problems. Instead, it is exac-
erbating them. In order to foster real stability and stem the flow of refu-
gees to United States shores, the real concern of the Clinton
Administration, the root causes of poverty in Haiti must be addressed.
Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration is supporting the imposition
of a sort of boilerplate World Bank/International Monetary Fund "struc-
tural adjustment" program in Haiti. It restricts wages, favors the export-
oriented private sector at the expense of small-scale food producers, and
forces resource-stripped local producers to compete with subsidized,
highly capitalized foreign companies.33
The United States Agency for International Development, the
World Bank, and other donors claim that one of their primary goals is to
alleviate poverty. Recently, they have put together an unprecedented
$1.2 billion aid-and-loan package for Haiti. But past support of export-
led development, with anti-poverty programs added on, has met with
little success.
In January 1995, the Inter-American Development Bank issued a
joint donor report on the proposed economic recovery program in
Haiti.34 It suggested three major shortcomings of past assistance pro-
grams: no national ownership, little measurable impact on basic eco-
nomic and social indicators, and no sustainability. Given this stunning
admission of failure from the agencies that put more than two billion
dollars into Haiti during the 1980's, it is certainly appropriate to ask why
they are not following a different strategy.
In point of fact, until quite recently, Haiti's poor majority has been
excluded from any decision making role regarding the economy. The
same is not true for the elites. The Haitian government-sponsored,
United States AID-funded Presidential Commission on Modernization
and Growth, dominated by Haiti's business elites, has an official policy
advisory role. This allows the elites to travel to the United States to seek
increased support from the Administration, Congress, and potential
investors.
33. This appears to be the same model that led Mexico into financial collapse by undermining
the production of small farmers, building export industries on exploited labor, and concentrating
wealth and resources in the hands of the very few.
34. EMERGENCY ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
REPORT OF THE JOINT MISSION (Nov. 7-20, 1994), Annex I (Jan. 3, 1995).
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There is, however, a serious problem with this access. It is one-
sided only. No parallel programs or efforts exist to draw expertise, pri-
orities, or advice from the more than ninety percent of Haiti's population
that makes its living from small-scale agriculture, artisan production,
and other small enterprises.
The Clinton Administration's support of macro-economic policies,
and the Aristide and Preval governments' agreement with these policies,
will create as great a threat to democracy as the armed right-wing
paramilitary forces that continue to haunt the Haitian nation. Without a
basic change in economic development policy, the stranglehold of pov-
erty on the Haitian people will remain unbroken, and their hard-won
progress toward democracy will quickly erode. Corporativism will
prevail.
The Aristide government's, and now the Preval government's, most
difficult challenge in creating a democracy has not only been that of
encouraging political pluralism in the formal sense, which is certainly a
very difficult but indispensable task. Even more important, these suc-
cessive democratically elected governments must decide whether the
economic plans that have become one of the central fixtures of their
democratic program - and that have brought the Aristide and Preval
governments international support - will simply be imposed on the
Haitian people, or whether the Haitian State will finally begin to listen to
the voices of the people.
To be completely fair, there has been a real attempt by the econo-
mists who drafted the economic program, Leslie Delatorre and Leslie
Voltaire, to ask for critical views of many Haitians who are not part of
Aristide's faction. This openness, of course, signals an extraordinary
change in Haitian politics. But those who have criticized the plan are
not necessarily the peasants who will be most adversely affected by it.
Thus, the debate must include not only international agencies, Haitian
expatriates, old-line political parties, and the elites, but the voices of the
very people whose future is most at stake - the vast poor majority.
There are signs of hope. As the December 1995 presidential elec-
tion grew near, this debate became central to the campaign. At that
time, President Aristide refused to accede to the demands made by the
international community for total privatization of the nine major govern-
ment-owned enterprises. He not only disagreed with total privatization
on substantively solid grounds, but also listened to the public uproar
against such a policy. As a result, the international community withheld
the promised funds, claiming that the Haitian government's refusal to




The debate continues into President Preval's term. Preval, unlike
Aristide, seems to favor the plan of total privatization, at least publicly.
Others in his party, and many of the masses, disagree. While disruptive,
the national debate, which continues through 1999, is also a positive step
in the transition to democracy. It is a step in the development of a public
dialogue.35
IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS
While Haiti, Eastern European, and Latin American nations strive
toward democracy, it is clear that experimentation is in order, particu-
larly in the political and economic spheres. The overriding characteris-
tic of the political and economic life in developing nations is the desire
to avoid either a national-populist or a neo-liberal project. In today's
global economy, neither approach seems promising.
The import-substituting, protectionist style of industrialization and
the pseudo-Keynesian public finance of a nationalist-populist approach
seem unable to deal effectively with the huge problems facing these
nations. Neoliberalism (neoliberalismo), Latin American's single-
minded pursuit of foreign investment and the accompanying austerity
and inequality, is unable to service the real conditions of sustained eco-
nomic growth.
Neoliberalism's rise to the status of religious doctrine is in part due
to the influence of the United States. The Reagan Administration
pushed the Latin Americans into pro-business austerity programs and set
the tone for a world-wide reduction of government's role. The policy's
acceptance in Latin America is also due to the wealth of its corporative
backers in a region where money matters above all else in politics.
But neoliberalism is also a response to the failure of a national-
populist approach. Indeed, the continent still faces the problems of
hyperinflation and stagnation created by irrational, closed economies
and massive public spending.
What is needed now, however, is to fix neoliberalism's major
flaw-chiefly that it does not help the poor, vast majority live a digni-
fied life. Instead, corporative power creates wealth for a small minority,
while almost enslaving the majority. Indeed, if government does not
spread the benefits of globalization, countries will remain divided
between a very small group of ultra-rich businessmen and a large group
of marginalized people.
Unlike neoliberalism's claim that government should play a minor
35. For a more thorough discussion of the privatization issue, and economic policy in general,
see SILENCING THE GUNS N HAM, supra note 2.
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role in the economy, real democratic change requires government to
play an important role. At a minimum, these nations must pursue
locally designed policies to draw the poor into the global economy. To
do this, these governments must pursue a rather different vision of a
political economy than the one traditionally accepted.
To begin with, these nations must be serious about macro-economic
stabilization. They must impose taxes upon the privileged classes to
allow for public investment in people and infrastructure. One possibility
would be to impose a direct, consumption-based tax, taxing the differ-
ence between income and savings, as a way to finance the state and
promote capital formation and productive investment.
There must be a major push to train the poor majority in a variety
of skills needed in the global economy. Education is central to reform.
This approach would also suggest attempting joint public-private owner-
ship of enterprises and encouraging decentralized capital allocation and
management. If the break down of corporative control of the economy
is to succeed, however, the strict requirements of capitalism must be
imposed on these so-called free-market capitalists. Thus, the private
sector must actually be privatized, allowing, for real competition. This
requires laws opening the market so that everyone can compete on a
level playing field. In addition, it is necessary to develop public compa-
nies and impose upon them the requirements of competition and
independent financial responsibility. Parliament has to pass laws which
encourage such activity.
On the political front, there must be an ability to counter the threat
of oligarchic control of political power. There must be a facility for the
rapid resolution of major political impasses through granting priority to
programmatic legislation, liberal resort to plebiscites and referenda, and
perhaps the vesting of power in the executive and legislative branches to
call new elections in the face of serious disagreements over the direction
the country should take.
This is not all. Measures must be taken to broaden the scope and
heighten the level of political mobilization in society. As discussed
above, this requires strengthening the role of political parties, public
financing of campaigns, increased free access to radio and television,
and the breakup of the broadcasting cartel. Political organizing, at all
levels, must be encouraged through specific government programs.
Direct democracy must be systematically organized and planned.
V. CONCLUSION
Almost all nations undergoing the transition from dictatorship to
democracy face the power of corporations. The actors are not necessar-
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ily always the same; for example, the Catholic Church does not have the
same role in Haiti as it does in Argentina, and trade unions hold different
positions in Haiti than in Brazil. But the script is nevertheless repeated
in each country because the formal creation or reestablishment of demo-
cratic rule is not sufficient to destroy the corporative power relationships
built up during the dictatorship periods. Indeed, these citadels of power
are insidious.
In this essay, I have argued that the best way to strengthen the
workings of democracy against corporative power is to somehow
include the formerly excluded majority into the decision making process
and implementation of government action. Stated otherwise, direct pop-
ular participation is a necessary aspect of creating a true democracy.
This follows from the epistemic vision of democracy I have described.
Moreover, the best method for achieving this goal is to perfect mecha-
nisms of representation and strengthen political parties, which must
themselves be internally democratic and open, disciplined, and ideologi-
cally defined.
In addition, creative attempts at economic and social reform must
work hand-in-hand with the requisite political reform. Direct popular
participation must reach all aspects of public and private life. Experi-
mentation is called for because old methods have not transformed these
societies to allow the individual citizen the freedom and dignity each
human being is due.
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